INTRODUCTION
The principal motivation for this paper Is that on-site verification of ICBMs In the context of a strategic arms agreement may be a practical possibility in the not-too-distant future.
In a situation where on-site inspection would be permitted, it would be likely that both sides would prefer not to allow total inspection but rather to permit inspection of a subset of the ICBMs. If the ICBMs were deceptively based in a number of identical areas, the Inspector could choose one or more areas to Inspect, and would have some confidence that the area or areas would be representative of the entire force.
In this paper the force of ICBMs is allocated across a number of areas such that each area contains an identical number of missiles and shelters.^ ^'
VJlth respect to interceptor defense, an arms control agreement would Ideally (from an inspection point of view) require that Inteceptors also be allocated such that each area contains an Identical number of interceptors. This would permit verification of the total number of Interceptors much easier than would a scheme which monitors the total number before their deployment to the areas or a scheme which estimates the ■ total number based on sample observations from inspections.
The present paper addresses the Interceptor allocation problem by allowing a total number of interceptors to be allocated across areas and observing under what conditions being limited to uniform allocation results in fewer surviving missiles.
Allocations across areas refer to assignments to areas while allocations within areas refer to assignments to shelters.
In the basic game studied here the attacker and defender know the number of warheads of the attacker and the number of missiles, shelters and Interceptors of the defender. The attacker allocates warheads across areas as he desires, and within areas uniformly to shelters. The defender has already allocated missiles and shelters uniformly across areas. He now, effectively simultaneously with the attacker (or, equivalently, not known in advance to the attacker), allocates interceptors across areas as he desires. Two interceptor assignment procedures within areas are investigated. First, the defender assigns interceptors uniformly within areas to defend missiles. Second, the defender observes the attack and then assigns Interceptors preferentially within, areas to attempt to maximize the number of surviving missiles.
The number of warheads in the attack is not actually known to the defender for planning purposes since the attacker may expend a subset of his total warhead inventory in the attack.
Therefore, the robustness of the number of surviving missiles to the attacker's choice of number of warheads is an important issue. The basic framework of the paper facilitates examination of robustness of surviving missiles of the defender to warhead expenditure of the attacker. ■
One limitation of the paper should be highlighted. Interceptors are assume^^ not to be vulnerable to attack before a main attack on shelters. There are several plausible situations under which this might be a reasonable assumption, as follows. First, interceptors could be in missile shelters and be assumed to be able to fire at warheads aimed at missiles before warheads hit the shelters in which the interceptors reside. Second, interceptors could be mobile and not targetable.
Third, interceptors could be deceptively based in enough cf their own shelters that the attacker would prefer not to expend warheads on attacking them. However, if Interceptors are vulnerable to a precursor attack a completely different analysis of the problem, including use of interceptors to defend other Interceptors, is necessary. , B
ATTACKER AND DEFENDER ALLOCATIONS ACROSS AREAS
A set of allocation options is defined for the attacker and a set of allocation options is defined for the defender. These options are chosen so as to span a wide spectrum of possibilities. Optimal attack and defense options are determined from among these options.
Attacking warheads can be allocated uniformly across all areas or according to one of two possible non-uniform allocations:
70 percent to shelters in half of areas and 30 percent to shelters in half of areas (called 70-30 allocation), and 90 percent to shelters in half of areas and 10 percent to shelters in half of areas (called 90-10 allocation). For instance, if there were 1000 attacking warheads and ten areas, uniform allocation would result in 100 warheads per area in all ten areas; 90-10 allocation would result in 900 warheads in five areas (l80 warheads per area) and 100 warheads in five areas (20 warheads per area). Henceforth we will drop the word perfectly and refer to matched and mis-matched combinations. The outcome of matched may sometimes favor the attacker and sometimes favor the defender, as will be explored below, and similarly for the outcome of mis-matched. '
It should be noted that when a 90-10 allocation is optimal for the attacker or defender a 100-0 allocation (defined similarly) might yield better payoff. A more complete analysis would Increase the number of allocations available to both sides.
C.
RESOURCES AND PROBABILITIES OF KILL . |
The analysis considers the following resources and parameters:
' i _ Missiles and shelters are allocated identically to ten areas.
As mentioned previously, the attacker and defender can allocate warheads and interceptors to areas as follows:
(1) uniform i (2) 70% to half of areas and 30% to half of areas (3) 90f» to half of areas and 10% to half of areas.
Finally, the interceptors within an area can be limited to defending the missile to which they are assigned, or the interceptors within an area can be allocated to warheads preferentially after the attack is observed (defending the missiles from least-attacked to most-attacked, thus attempting to obtain the most surviving missiles for a given number of interceptors).
D.

MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
The Monte Carlo simulation addresses the problem of estimating expected numbers of surviving missiles, together with variances. For uniform defense within areas an analytical expression for computing this quantity is available. However, for preferential defense within areas no analytical expression is known to us. There is no specific preferential defense procedure knovmto us to be best for the defender-, so it is useful to experiment with various schemes. The Monte Carlo simulation enables uniform defense within areas and preferential defense within areas to be studied with one internally consistent model.
For the analyses discussed in this paper, 30 sample trials are run for each case of a particular size of attack and de-■ fense.
The present paper is limited to interceptors defending only the areas to which they are assigned. Also of interest are layered defenses which include longer-range Interceptors capable of defending more than one area. For problems involving layered defenses analytical approaches are intractable except in special cases. The analyses of References [1] and [2] employ a layered defense model known to compute expected numbers of survivors incorrectly in some cases. The Monte Carlo simulation utilized for the present analysis is structured to treat layered defenses, but has not yet been applied to analyses of layered defense problems. We sum..iarize below the model's functions when interceptors defend only the area to which they are allocated.
steps
The steps of the Monte Carlo simulation are as follows, for the case of uniform defense of missiles within areas:
1. Allocate missiles and shelters uniformly to areas.
2. Allocate interceptors to areas in proportions desired.
3.
Allocate warheads to areas in proportions desired. 4. In each area, assign missiles randomly among shelters.
Assign interceptors to missiles until interceptors are exhausted (e.g., if there are 20 missiles'and 30 interceptors, assign 2 interceptors each to first 10 missiles and 1 interceptor each to second 10 missiles . ) 5. In each area, assign warheads to shelters as uniformly as possible.
6. For each missile, note how many warheads are arriving and how many interceptors are defending. Allocate interceptors as uniformly as possible across warheads.
7. Compute surviving warheads after interceptor/warhead engagement using random numbers and interceptor kill probabilities.
8.
Compute surviving missiles after warhead/missile engagement using random numbers and warhead kill probabilities.
For the case of preferential defense of missiles within areas, steps 4 and 6 are changed. In step 4, interceptors are not assigned to missiles beforehand.
In step 6, after the warhead assignments are observed, interceptors are assigned to defend missiles in such a way that warheads are matched one-for- 5. In the first five areas, assign one warhead each to the 100 shelters. Then assign one more warhead each to the first 80 shelters. In the second five areas, assign one warhead each to the first 20 shelters. ^ 6. For each missile, note how many warheads are arriving and how many interceptors are defending. In the first five areas there will be two warheads arriving on some shelters and one warhead arriving on the remaining shelters. All 20 missiles will be defended by one Interceptor each.
7.
In each of the 10 areas, compute the surviving warheads aimed at each missile, after the interceptor/warhead engagement, the result of which is determined by drawing a random number in the interval 0 to 1 and comparing it with the interceptor kill probability.
' ' 8.
In each of the 10 areas, for each missile, determine if that missile survives after being attacked by a warhead (if there is a surviving warhead aimed at it) by drawing a random number in the interval 0 to 1 and comparing it with the warhead kill probability.
E.
MATRIX GAMES
For each combination of attacker and defender resources and parameters, a three-by-three matrix game for attacker and defender allocations is generated. The tableau of Figure 1 , previously presented, provides the row and column descriptions for the three attacker and the three defender allocations.
Define the attacker advantage warheads _ interceptors shelters missiles
The parameter a can be interpreted as the average number of unopposed warheads per missile. In the special case of uniform attack and defense allocations, if a is a positive integer there are exactly a unopposed warheads per missile.
As an example, consider an attack by 2000 warheads on 200 missiles in 1000 shelters, with attacker kill probability = .7 and defender kill probability = .7. Let there be uniform defense within areas. In these games, the row player (the attacker) is attempting to minimize surviving missiles, while the column player (the defender) is attempting to maximize surviving missiles. The attacker is guaranteed that survivors will be no more than the minmax value (denoted by an asterisk) and the defender is guaranteed that survivors will be no less than the maxmin value (denoted by an asterisk). The minmax value and maxmin value are equal in games with pure strategy solutions and different in gam.es with mixed strategy solutions.
The first game, with attacker superiority, has a pure strategy solution. The attacker allocates his warheads uniformly. The defender uses a 90-10 allocation with l80 defenders in half the areas (36 in each area, for an average of 1.8 per missile) and 20 defenders in half the areas (4 in each area, for an average of .2 per missile). If the defender were to know that the attacker allocation was surely uniform, he could not benefit by this knowledge but would still use the 90-10 allocation (within the three allocations permitted here; if allowed, he would move toward a 100-0 allocation).
If, on the other hand, the attacker knew the defender was surely using 90-10, and if the attacker could also achieve a perfect match, he could use 70-30 to reduce the survivors from 67 to 59. Presenting the information on (matched, mis-matched) in the matrix games gives a measure of both the range of outcomes and the value of information about the opponent's allocation.
The second game, with attacker and defender in parity (a=0), has a mixed strategy solution. The value of the game (110) is between the values associated with the attac;:er's minmax strategy (111) and the defender's maxmin stragegy (108). For the two allocations of both sides in the mixed strategy solution the outcomes range from 101 to 123.
13
The third game, with defender superiority, has a pure strategy solution. The attacker chooses a 90-10 allocation and the defender defends uniformly. If the defender were to know the exact attacker 90-10 allocation and could achieve a perfect 90-10 match, he could raise the payoff from 146 to l62 
■ ■ ■
Robustness of defender allocations can be Illustrated by considering the middle column of Figure 3 , specifically the change in attacking warheads from 2,000 to 4,000. If the defender is optimizing against 2,000 warheads his expected payoff is 110, resulting from randomizing between the first two options. If he is concerned about an attack of 4,000 warheads he should choose the third option, which is much better against 4,000 warheads (yielding at least 30 survivors as compared to at least 11 or l6) but much worse against 2,000 warheads (yielding at least 98 survivors as compared to at least 108 or 101). 
«r . surviving missiles in the fourth group). The significant difference is due to the fact that when d = ,7 the expected number of warheads getting through the defense is more than one, while when d = .95 the expected number of missiles getting through the defenses is far less than one; the latter case thus yields significantly more surviving missiles. Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 reveal that mixed strategies are not employed when there is preferential defense (except for two cases in which numerical properties result in mixed strategies, but in these two cases the minmax and maxmin values are essentially identical.) There are significant changes in optimal allocations when defense is changed from uniform defense within areas to preferential defense within areas.
In particular, when the attacker is superior the payoff from all three types of defender allocation is essentially identical, rather than the defender obtaining much higher payoff from non-uniform allocations. Thus uniform interceptor allocations to areas become satisfactory, and verification of arms control agreements becomes much easier. Furthermore, uniform interceptor allocations are robust against increases in attack sizes, Table 2 Table 3 summarizes the game values from these figures, together with results for 1000 shelters. Table 3 shows that when both warheads and shelters are doubled the number of surviving missiles is constant. Doubling the number of shelters simply shifts 'the results of Table 2 . For uniform attack and defense within areas results are entirely dependent on the average engagement at each defended missile, as represented by a.
Figures 11, 12, 13 and l4 are included for documentation purposes. They contain more defense-favorable cases and fewer offense-favorable cases than do Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10. However, the interesting cases where a is fairly close to zero are the same in the two sets of matrix games except for Monte Carlo effects. Table 2 should hold for equal values of a.
3^+
J.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
When the defender Is limited to uniform defense within areas and the situation is either parity with moderate defender kill probability (a = 0 and d=.7) or small attacker advantage with high defender kill probability (0 £ a £ 2 and d=.95), mixed strategies are optimal. If the situation is either attacker advantage with moderate defender kill probability (a > 0 and d=.7) or significant attacker advantage with high defender kill probability (a > 2 and d=.95), uniform attack across areas and non-uniform defense across areas are optimal. If the situation is defender advantage (a < 0), non-uniform attack across areas and uniform defense across areas are optimal.
When the defender can employ preferential defense within ■ areas the expected number of surviving missiles Increases significantly in the cases of parity and attacker advantage (a >_ 0). All three defense allocations yield essentially the same payoff; thus non-uniform interceptor allocations across areas are not necessary and the more-easily-verifiable uniform allocations are satisfactory.
Obtaining information on the other side's allocation can yield a much-improved payoff. This has particular practical significance in the situation where the defender is limited to uniform defense within areas, the attacker is superior, and the defender's best allocation is non-uniform across areas.
Increasing shelters from 1000 to 2000 yields the same results for the same values of a since engagements at the missiles within the areas are the same. This is true for both uniform defense within areas and preferential defense within areas.
' ■
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The figures permit Identification of defensive options which are robust against increases In attacking warheads. This is particularly Important for uniform defense within areas.
Two limitations should be noted with respect to the scope of the analysis: 36 ber of surviving missiles can be calculated using only the results of perfectly matched and perfectly mismatched allocations.
The general set-up of the problem is this. There are 2N areas which receive warheads and endos as follows. The attacker allocates P percent of his warheads evenly among N randomly chosen areas; the remaining 100-P percent of the warheads are evenly allocated to the remaining N areas. The defender performs a similar allocation using Q and 100-Q percent of his endos. The attacker and defender make area selections independently from one another. Given all such random choices of areas, what is the expected number of surviving missiles?
In our analysis, the total number of missiles, warheads, and endos is fixed, as are P and Q. We assume these numbers are such that each area receives an integral number of warheads and endos, and that an equal number of missiles is assigned to each area. The allocation method provides that N areas receive the same "high" number of warheads, and N areas receive the same "low" number of warheads. These are the N areas receiving either P or 100-P percent of the warheads.
Similarly, N areas receive "high" and "low" numbers of endos. In either case, the high and low numbers may be equal if P or Q e^^uals 50 percent. In this event, the randoai choice of areas has no effect on the expected value, which is computed directly by the model. Henceforth, we may assume P, Q do not equal 50 percent.
A-2 I.
There are four characteristically different situations occurring within the areas. These are determined by the high or low number of warheads or endos assigned to a given area. For example, the case (high, high) occurs if an area receives the high number of warheads and the high number of endos. In an analogous manner we define the last three cases:
(high, low), (low, high), (low, low). Let the expected number of surviving missiles for each area case be a, 6, y, S, respectively.
For a given allocation, let X be the number of areas of the (high, high) case which results. Note that 0 < X < N.
Then the other three cases occur with the multiplicities shown in Table A Note that the perfectly matched allocation corresponds to X = N, with expected number of survivors NA. The perfectly mismatched allocation corresponds to X = 0, with NB expected survivors.
A^3
In the following, the combinatorial notation ( M-M! P!(M-P)! equals the number of distinct ways P Identical objects can be placed In M distinct boxes, no more than one object to a box (P<M; To compute the expected number of survivors over all attacker and defender allocations, we lose no generality by fixing an arbitrary defender allocation, and letting the attacker allocations vary completely.
There are ( ^p ways the attacker can allocate M high and N low warhead levels to 2N areas. In summary, the expected number of surviving missiles over all possible attacker and defender allocations is the average of the perfectly matched and the perfectly mismatched allocations A-5
